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Liberalising the Energy Markets of Western Europe – 
A Computable Equilibrium Model Approach 
 
 
Finn Roar Aune1, Rolf Golombek2, Sverre A. C. Kittelsen3 and  
Knut Einar Rosendahl4  
 
Abstract 
Using a computable equilibrium model, we examine the short-run effects of a radical 
liberalisation of the West European natural gas and electricity markets. In each model 
country, oil, gas, coal and electricity are produced, traded and consumed. There are 
world markets for oil and coal, and well-integrated competitive markets for gas and 
electricity in Western Europe. Gas and electricity are transported and traded across 
markets under the assumption of ideal third-party access regimes for transportation 
and limited capacities in the transportation networks. We find that relative to the base 
year 1996, a radical liberalisation reduces the average end-user price of natural gas by 
around 20 per cent, and the average end-user price of electricity by around 50 per 
cent. Supply of electricity increases by around 20 per cent, mainly due to increased 
coal power production. After such liberalisation, coal power emerges with the largest 
market share of electricity production in Western Europe.  
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1  Introduction 
The past 15 years have seen various initiatives to liberalise the natural gas and 
electricity industry in Western Europe. The process has been driven both at the 
national level and by the EU Commission, which has worked out several proposals to 
enhance competition at all levels in the energy markets. The objective of the 
Commission is to transform heavily regulated national markets into efficient 
European markets through regulatory reforms. If this process succeeds, there will be 
major changes in the natural gas and electricity industry. The purpose of the present 
article is to examine, within a computable equilibrium model, the short-run effects 
that would follow from such a radical liberalisation of the energy markets of Western 
Europe.1 
Until the mid-1980s, the natural gas and electricity industry in all Western European 
countries was subject to various government regulations and controls. These 
regulations significantly affected all levels of the industry – extraction, import, 
transport, distribution and prices. One example is France, where the state-owned 
company Gaz de France has had a legal monopoly on imports and a virtual monopoly 
on transport. Another example is Germany, which for many years had regional 
monopolies in electricity production. However, the past 15 years have seen tendencies 
in some countries toward greater competition in the energy industry. The obvious 
example here is the UK,  where liberalisation started in 1986 when British Gas 
Corporation was transferred intact to the private sector as a 100 percent monopoly 
supplier. Since then, additional reforms have been imposed; today most experts assess 
the UK natural gas and electricity industry as being fairly competitive.  
 
The EU Commission has also made efforts to liberalise the energy markets of 
Western Europe. In 1988, the Commission published a working document on the 
Internal Energy Market (see Commission of the European Communities, 1988), 
proposing various initiatives like harmonisation of taxation, price transparency and 
                                                          
1  While we use an empirical approach to studying the effects of liberalisation, there is an extensive 
literature on optimal management and expansion of a completely integrated and efficient, mixed hydro-
thermal electricity industry; see e.g. Nelson (1964). For a theoretical discussion on the long-term gains 
from interconnecting existing systems of different technologies (no market failures within each system 
prior to trade), see von der Fehr and Sandsbråten (1997).  
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interconnection of grids. These proposals met with opposition from several Member 
States as well as from part of  the energy industry, leading the Commission to prepare 
a set of revised policy proposals. A milestone was reached in 1998, when the Member 
States agreed to establish an internal market for natural gas. The main idea is 
gradually to open up national markets for competition, partly through extensive use of 
third-party access to transport and distribution (Thackeray, 1999). These regulatory 
reforms are in line with an earlier EU directive on how to achieve enhanced 
competition in the Western European electricity markets (see IEA, 2000).  
 
The starting point of the present study is the assumption that EU succeeds in 
establishing efficient internal markets for natural gas and electricity. Employing a 
computable equilibrium model of the energy markets, we examine the short-run 
effects that will follow from a radical liberalisation of these markets. We seek to 
answer questions like 
 
• To what extent will enhanced competition push down prices on natural gas and 
electricity? 
• To what extent will a radical liberalisation change the total production of 
electricity in Western Europe?  
• Which electricity technologies will capture a larger market share? 
 
In order to answer these questions, we construct a numerical equilibrium model of the 
Western European energy markets, with 13 European countries. In each country there 
is production, trade and consumption of four energy goods: oil, coal, natural gas and 
electricity. There are competitive world markets for oil and coal, and well-integrated 
competitive markets for natural gas and electricity in Western Europe. Natural gas 
and electricity are transported and traded under the assumption of ideal third-party 
access regimes for transport and limited capacities in the transport networks.  
 
In each country various technologies are available for supplying electricity – for 
example, gas power, coal power, nuclear and reservoir hydro power. Because 
electricity cannot be stored (except in limited-capacity hydro-reservoirs), and demand 
varies significantly between day and night as well as with the seasons (summer vs. 
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winter), there are seasonally differentiated and time-of-day differentiated markets for 
electricity. On the other hand, all fossil fuels are traded in annual markets. End-users 
demand all four energy goods. In addition, fossil fuels are used in the production of 
thermal power (e.g., gas power). 
 
Our model allows for an analysis of a radical liberalisation that includes both natural 
gas and electricity. Due to inter-fuel competition, natural gas can be used to produce 
power, and power competes with natural gas in end-user demand. It would therefore 
seem logical to examine these two energy goods simultaneously. Yet, to our 
knowledge, there have been no studies on liberalisation of the Western European 
energy markets that deal with this type of inter-fuel competition. Although Amundsen 
and Tjøtta (1997) examine a liberalisation of the Western European electricity market, 
their study does not model any market for natural gas: that is, gas power producers are 
faced by an exogenous price for natural gas. Similarly, there exist studies on the 
effects following from a liberalisation of the electricity market in a given region, such 
as Johnsen (1998) for the case of the Nordic electricity market; as well as studies on 
national electricity markets, such as Andersson and Bergman (1995) for the case of 
Sweden, and Kemfert (2000) for the case of Germany. Golombek, Gjelsvik and 
Rosendahl (1995) analyse a liberalisation of the Western European natural gas 
market without specifying a market for electricity; in their study, demand functions 
for natural gas reflect the price of electricity in the base year of the model.   
 
The impacts of a liberalisation will depend on the marginal cost of electricity 
production. Some studies, e.g. Amundsen and Tjøtta (1997), have an increasing 
marginal cost function for thermal power production, without specifying the marginal 
cost function of each type of technology (coal power, gas power and oil power). Other 
studies, e.g. Johnsen (1998), allow for variations in marginal cost of production across 
technologies, but not across plants using the same type of technology (within the same 
country). In the present study, the marginal costs of electricity production differ 
across countries, technologies and across plants that use the same type of technology 
(within the same country). Moreover, in contrast to several electricity studies, we 
include cost elements of electricity production other than fuel costs, namely (fixed) 
start-up costs and (fixed) maintenance costs. Because all cost elements are included in 
the Lagrangian of the electricity producers, we can derive optimal capacity utilisation 
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over time at the plant level. This is an improvement relative to the traditional 'load 
duration' approach, in which the composition of technologies in high load periods is 
de facto exogenous and the start-up cost is a variable cost; see e.g. Kahn, Marnay and 
Berman, 1992.  
 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In Section 2 we describe the computable 
equilibrium model in detail, focusing on electricity supply. Section 3 presents the 
equilibrium outcome of the model. We find that, relative to the base year 1996, a 
radical liberalisation reduces the average end-user price of natural gas by around 20 
per cent, and the average end-user price of electricity by around 50 per cent. Supply 
of electricity increases by around 20 per cent, mainly due to increased coal power 
production. After liberalisation, coal power emerges with the largest market share. In 
Section 4 we summarise our conclusions.  
 
2 The model 
The model involves four energy goods: electricity, natural gas, oil and coal. In this 
model, electricity is produced, consumed and traded in four time periods, whereas 
fossil fuels are extracted, consumed and traded in annual markets. All markets are 
fully competitive. However, while electricity and natural gas are traded in Western 
European markets, oil and coal are traded in world markets. We distinguish between 
the 13 model countries (Austria, Belgium [including Luxembourg], Denmark, 
Finland, France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden 
and Switzerland) in which production, trade and consumption are endogenous, and 
exogenous countries.  
We begin with a detailed description of the modelling of electricity supply. Next, we 
present the other elements of the model – supply of fossil fuels, demand for energy, 
international trade in energy, demand and supply from the exogenous countries and 
equilibrium conditions.2  
 
                                                          
2  A full technical description of the model is given in Aune, Golombek, Kittelsen and Rosendahl, 
2001. 
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Electricity supply 
Production of electricity takes place in each model country through various 
technologies (some are not available in all countries): gas power, oil power, coal 
power, pumped storage power, reservoir hydro power, nuclear, waste power and 
renewables. In all countries in our model, electricity is produced in two seasons 
(summer and winter); within each season there are two periods (day and night). In 
general, for each technology and each country, efficiency varies across electricity 
plants. However, instead of specifying heterogeneous plants within each category of 
electricity production (technologies and countries), we model the supply of electricity 
from each category as if there were one single plant with increasing marginal costs.  
 
We begin by studying electricity supplied from the combustion of fossil fuels. Then 
we examine the supply from plants based on non-fossil fuels. There are three fossil 
fuel technologies: gas power, oil power and coal power. Because electricity 
production based on these technologies can be modelled in the same way, we focus on 
one type only (henceforth referred to as gas power). To simplify notation, we drop 
country specification.  
 
There are four types of costs involved in gas power production. Firstly, there are costs 
directly related to combustion of natural gas. Let tν be the average amount of natural 
gas (in the sector) required to produce one unit of electricity in period t: that is, tν is a 
combination of the inverse energy efficiency and a unit conversion factor ( tν is 
increasing in electricity production, which reflects increasing marginal costs). Then 
fuel costs in period t are given by GtPν , where GP  is the (annual) user price of 
natural gas for the gas-power producer. In addition to fuel costs, there are other inputs 
(with exogenous prices) that are assumed to vary proportionately to production, 
implying a constant unit operating cost Oc .  
 
Let PK be installed power capacity in the gas power sector. In addition to choosing an 
electricity output level, the producer is assumed to choose the level of power capacity 
that is maintained ( PMK ), thus incurring a unit maintenance cost Mc  per power unit. 
Finally, if the producer chooses to produce electricity in only  one of the periods in 
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each season (e.g. daytime), he will incur a daily start-up cost. In this model the start-
up cost Sc is expressed as a cost per start-up power capacity ( PSK ) in each season. 
The short-run cost function is therefore 
 
 ( )O G M PM S PSt t t
t T t T
C c P y c K c Kν
∈ ∈
= + + +∑ ∑  (1) 
where ty  is production of power in period t and T is the set containing all four time 
periods. Operating surplus (short-run profits) are given by: 
 
 t t
t T
P y C
∈
Π = −∑  (2) 
where tP  is the price of electricity in period t. 
 
The producer maximises surplus, given several constraints. Below, the restrictions on 
the optimisation problem are given in solution form, where the Kuhn-Tucker 
multiplier – complementary to each constraint – is also indicated. The first constraint 
requires that maintained power capacity ( PMK ) should be less than or equal to total 
installed power capacity ( PK ): 
 0,PM PK K λ≤ ⊥ ≥  (3) 
where λ  is the shadow price of installed power capacity.3  
Secondly, in each period, production of electricity is constrained by the maintained 
energy capacity, i.e. the number of hours available for electricity production ( tψ ) 
multiplied by maintained power capacity ( PMK ):  
 
 0.PMt t ty Kψ µ≤ ⊥ ≥  (4) 
All power plants need some down-time for technical maintenance. Hence, total annual 
production cannot exceed a share ( ξ ) of the rated instantaneous capacity: 
                                                          
3 In general, 0 0a b≤ ⊥ ≥  means 0 0 0a or b or ab≤ ≥ = . 
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 0.PMt t
t T t T
y Kξ ψ η
∈ ∈
≤ ⊥ ≥∑ ∑  (5) 
Finally, for each season, the difference between capacity use in one period and 
capacity use in the other period is constrained by the capacity that is started each day 
in that season ( PStK ): 
 0,PSt u t tut
y y K φψ ψ− ≤ ⊥ ≥  (6) 
where t
t
y
ψ is actual capacity in period t and u u
y ψ is actual capacity in the other 
period in the same season. For each pair of periods in the same season there are thus 
two inequalities, which together imply two different non-negative start-up capacities 
(only one will be non-zero in equilibrium).  
 
For gas power (as well as oil power and coal power) the Lagrangian of the 
optimisation problem is 
 
 
 
{ }
{ }
L PM Pt t
t T
PM PM
t t t t t
t T t T t T
S PSt u
t tu tutt T u T
P y C K K
y K y K
y y K
λ
µ ψ η ξ ψ
φ δψ ψ
∈
∈ ∈ ∈
∈ ∈
= − − −
   − − − −    
   − − −    
∑
∑ ∑ ∑
∑ ∑
 (7) 
where the selector Stuδ  is equal to 1 for the other period u in the same season as period 
t, and to 0 for all other periods. The first-order condition with respect to produced 
electricity is: 
 0 0.O G St ut t t tu tut u T
P c P yφ φν µ η δψ ψ∈
 − − − − − − ≤ ⊥ ≥   ∑  (8) 
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where 
( )t t
t
t
y
y
νν ∂= ∂  is the marginal efficiency in period t.  Hence, in each period an 
internal solution requires that the difference between the price of electricity ( tP ) and 
the marginal cost of production ( O Gtc Pν+ ) should be equal to the sum of several 
shadow prices. These are the shadow price of the periodic energy capacity, the 
shadow price of the annual energy capacity, and the difference (measured per hour) 
between the shadow price of capacity used in this period and in the other period, in 
the same season. Next, the first-order condition with respect to maintained capacity is 
 { } 0,M PMt t
t T
c Kψ µ η ξ λ
∈
+ ≤ + ⊥ ≥∑  (9) 
that is, the cost of increasing maintained capacity marginally (the sum of the 
maintenance cost and the shadow price of installed capacity) should be equal to the 
value of increased production following from this policy (or maintained capacity 
should be zero). Finally, the first-order condition with respect to the start-up capacity 
is 
 
 0,S PSt tc Kφ ≤ ⊥ ≥  (10) 
that is, in each period the shadow price of start-up capacity should be equal to the 
start-up cost (or the start-up capacity should be zero).  
 
Equations (8) to (10)  imply that if a plant is producing during daytime, costs will 
increase if the plant does not produce during the night (the plant will incur a start-up 
cost). Hence, the start-up component tends to smooth out production from a plant over 
the day. However, smooth production combined with high demand during daytime 
and low demand at night will lead to increased price variation between day and night.  
 
We now turn to pumped storage power. This is when a producer buys electricity in 
one period (e.g. winter night) and uses that energy to pump water to the reservoir in 
order to produce electricity in a different, higher-cost, period (e.g. winter day). For 
this technology, the Lagrangian is similar to (7), except that the pumped storage 
producer uses electricity (and not fossil fuels) as an input.  
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The reservoir hydro power producer has two additional restrictions in his optimisation 
problem.  Firstly, total production of reservoir hydro power in season s ( Rsy ) plus the 
reservoir filling at the end of season s ( sR ) should not exceed the sum of the reservoir 
filling at the end of the previous season ( 1sR − ) and the seasonal inflow capacity (
I
sK ) 
expressed in energy units:  
 1 0.
R I
s s s ssy R R K α−+ ≤ + ⊥ ≥  (11) 
Secondly, the reservoir filling at the end of season s cannot exceed the reservoir 
capacity RK :  
 0.Rs sR K β≤ ⊥ ≥  (12) 
These two restrictions have the following impact on the first-order conditions. Firstly, 
the sum of the shadow prices in (8) should include the shadow price of the inflow 
capacity, as a higher inflow will lead to increased production (if production is 
restricted due to limited inflow). Secondly, an additional first-order condition requires 
that the sum of the shadow price of inflow capacity and reservoir capacity in season s 
should be equal to the shadow price of the inflow capacity in the next season 
(alternatively, that the reservoir should be empty at the end of season s): 
 1 0.s s ss Rα α β+ ≤ + ⊥ ≥  (13) 
The waste power producer has an additional restriction (relative to the gas power 
producer). For waste power, we require that production in each season should be 
constrained by the available waste in that season (measured in energy units); that is, 
we implicitly assume zero reservoir size. For nuclear, the Lagrangian is similar to that 
one for gas power, except that start-up capacity is exogenously set at zero. This 
constraint reflects the fact that, due to the time and costs involved in starting up and 
shutting down nuclear plants, it is not optimal to vary production between day and 
night. Finally, the energy capacity for renewables (geothermal, solar and wind) varies 
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across periods, but there is no storage possibility. Thus, in each period, production 
from renewables is exogenous (equal to observed supply in the base year).4  
Supply of fossil fuels 
For each of the model countries, supply of crude oil and coal is price dependent (in 
the standard way). For natural gas, currently sold on long-term contracts in Western 
Europe, extraction in the model countries is exogenous (all quantities are set equal to 
the observed values in the base year).5  
 
Energy demand 
In each model country, the two end-user sectors (household and manufacturing) 
demand all four energy goods. For each country and each type of end-user, demand is 
derived from a nested CES utility function. This functional form ensures globally 
fulfilment of regularity conditions derived from economic theory, which is important 
when modelling institutional changes that result in large price movements. Five nest 
levels, with associated substitution and share parameters, are necessary to achieve the 
desired own- and cross-price elasticities. The structure of nests is designed to 
facilitate meaningful economic interpretations.  
 
At the top nest level there are substitution possibilities between energy-related goods 
and other consumption. At the second level the consumers face a trade-off between 
consumption based on the four different energy sources. Each of these is a nest 
describing complementarity between the actual energy source and consumption goods 
that use this energy source (e.g. electricity and light bulbs). Finally, the fourth and 
fifth levels are specific to electricity in defining the substitution possibilities between 
summer and winter (season), and between day and night in each season. 
                                                          
4 For supply of electricity, a system levy ensures that there is always a reserve power capacity in each 
period and country. The levy is the result of a social optimisation problem not modelled here, and 
enters complementary to the reserve capacity constraint. Hence, this tax will be positive only if the 
constraint is binding. 
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In addition to final demand, there is intermediate demand from electricity producers; 
gas power producers demand natural gas, pumped storage producers demand 
electricity, etc. According to Shephard’s lemma, conditional on a given output level 
demand from an electricity producer is the derivative of the cost function w.r.t. the 
input price. Hence, using (1) intermediate demand (for natural gas) is  
 .G G t t
t T
Cx y
P
ν
∈
∂= =∂ ∑  (14) 
Trade in energy and transport of energy   
There is trade in all energy goods. Transport of goods from producers to end-users 
takes place on three levels: international transport, national transport and distribution 
(to households). Each country is represented by a central node. For each country, oil 
and coal is transported from the world market to the central node, at a given cost. 
Electricity (gas) is traded via international transmission lines (pipelines) that run 
between the nodes. All lines have given capacities. Each line is owned by one agent, 
who, being a price taker,  maximises the difference between (i) the purchasing price in 
one country and (ii) the sum of the selling price in another country plus the cost of 
transmission (loss in transport and the transport tariff). Hence, all arbitrage 
possibilities are exploited. However, for each line the (endogenous) transport tariff 
ensures that demand for transport does not exceed supply (the fixed capacity). 
Equilibrium   
In equilibrium, for each model country, and each of the three fossil fuels, the total 
quantities consumed are (less or) equal to total quantities delivered at the central node 
(minus a fixed proportion in distribution losses). For each period and each country, 
this condition also holds for electricity. For oil and coal, the sum of demand from all 
countries should be (less or) equal to total supply.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
5 For exogenous countries, supply of crude oil and coal are also price dependent (in the standard way). 
Similarly, demand for crude oil and coal are price dependent. On the other hand, non-model countries 
have an exogenous net export of natural gas and electricity to the region of the model countries.  
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3  Equilibrium outcome 
The model is solved in the GAMS modelling language (see Brooke, Kendrick, 
Meeraus and Raman, 1998), using the mixed complementarity (MCP) solver PATH 
(see Ferris and Munson, 1998). Much of our data build on statistics published by 
international organisations like OECD, UNIPEDE, UCPTE and NORDEL, 
supplemented with national sources when necessary. Costs parameters build on 
Golombek, Gjelsvik and Rosendahl (1995) and Amundsen and Tjøtta (1997). The 
direct price elasticities for coal, oil, natural gas and electricity draw on three 
econometric studies: The SEEM model (Brubakk et al., 1995), the E3ME model 
(Barker, 1998) and Franzen and Sterner (1995). The weighted household (industry) 
short-run elasticities for coal, oil, natural gas and electricity are –0.19 (–0.19), –0.21 
(–0.20), –0.22 (–0.27) and –0.32 (–0.20), respectively. Appendix A explains the main 
principles behind the calibration of the model. 
 
Prices 
Through increased domestic and international competition, non-competitive national 
markets with limited international trade are transformed into efficient well-integrated 
markets. Liberalisation therefore leads to lower (average) prices for electricity and 
natural gas. In equilibrium, all price differences reflect cost differences and tax 
differences only. 
 
After the radical liberalisation, the aggregate end-user price of electricity (aggregated 
over periods, sectors and countries) is 59.5 USD/MWh: that is, 50 per cent lower than 
in the base year 1996, as shown in Table 1. The drop is somewhat larger for 
household (54 per cent) than for industry (41 per cent). The percentage difference is 
higher when prices are measured without taxes, since the household segment pays 
higher taxes than the industry sector.  
 
The price drop in aggregate end-user price can be decomposed into (i) lower average 
price due to removal of price discrimination (for a given total quantity), and (ii) lower 
average price due to elimination of market power and hence increased production. In 
order to identify the magnitude of these effects, in a separate run of the model we 
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imposed a tax on production of electricity (faced by all power producers) that ensures 
that total equilibrium production is equal to total production in the base year. The 
difference between the new equilibrium and the base year reflects the partial effect of 
no price discrimination. We find that the partial effect of no price discrimination is a 
reduction in aggregate end-user price by 7 per cent. As noted above, the total 
reduction in aggregate end-user price is 50 per cent. 
 
The national producer prices of electricity (aggregated over periods) are in the range 
of 28 to 43 USD/MWh, with a weighted average of 36.0 USD/MWh, as shown in  
Table 1. Producer prices – and hence end-user prices – vary over season, and between 
day and night. This is because demand varies, and because marginal costs of 
production are increasing in total power production (less efficient plants are phased in 
as total production increases). In addition, the start-up cost tends to increase the price 
difference between daytime and night, cf. Section 2. The producer price (aggregated 
over countries) is highest for winter day (39.7 USD/TWh), next highest for summer 
day, next lowest for winter night and lowest for summer night (31.0 USD/MWh). The 
price difference between winter and summer is much higher than the price difference 
between day and night. In Norway and Sweden, where reservoir hydro power has a 
substantial market share,  period prices are equal except for winter day. For all other 
countries, prices differ across all four time periods. Maximum difference between 
highest and lowest producer price in a country is roughly 12 USD/MWh (for Belgium, 
Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and Great Britain).  
 
Liberalisation also leads to decreased prices of natural gas. The aggregate end-user 
price of natural gas (aggregated over countries and sectors) is 269 USD/toe, which is 
18 per cent lower than in the base year 1996. In percentage terms, the drop  is lower 
than for electricity. Because total consumption of natural gas is unchanged relative to 
1996 (cf. Section 2), the drop primarily reflects the removal of price discrimination, in 
addition to effects from other markets (The corresponding partial effect in the 
electricity market is 7 per cent, as indicated above).  
 
With no price discrimination, the total exogenous natural gas quantity is redistributed, 
which, cetibus paribus, leads to lower prices in the household sector but higher prices 
in the other two sectors. However, in this case the average price has decreased, 
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because price discrimination has come to an end. Note that a lower price of electricity 
has a negative impact on demand for natural gas (positive cross-price elasticities), and 
hence contributes to a lower equilibrium price of natural gas (and vice versa). The 
average producer price of natural gas is 126 USD/toe, as shown in Table 1.6  
 
 
Table 1 Prices of electricity and natural gas in a liberalised Western European 
energy market. Percentage change relative to 1996 in parenthesis.  
Price of electricity (USD/MWh) 
Aggregate producer price  
  Summer day 
  Summer night 
  Winter day 
  Winter night 
  Annual 
 
Aggregate end-user price  
   Household 
   Industry 
   Total 
 
  
39.4 (n.a.) 
31.0 (n.a.) 
39.7 (n.a.) 
31.8 (n.a.) 
36.0 (n.a.) 
 
 
71.7 (–54) 
42.9 (–41) 
59.5 (–50) 
Price of natural gas (USD/toe) 
Aggregate annual producer price  
 
Aggregate annual end-user price 
   Household 
   Industry 
   Gas power 
   Total 
 
126 (n.a.) 
 
 
363 (–27) 
191 (–4) 
166 (–9) 
269 (–18) 
    
 
 
Quantities 
Total production of electricity increases by 20 per cent (relative to 1996), that is, by 
496 TWh, cf. Figure 1. The increase in production for coal power, oil power and gas 
power is 57 per cent, 16 per cent and 12 per cent, respectively. For these technologies, 
the changes in production can be decomposed into (i) changed production due to 
changed use of input (the quantity effect), and (ii) changed production due to more 
efficient composition of plants (the allocation effect). In order to identify these two 
effects, in a separate run of the model we imposed taxes on the use of fossil fuels in 
electricity production (one tax for each fossil fuel). These taxes ensure that, for each 
                                                          
6  The world market price of crude oil decreases by 0.5 per cent. The drop reflects lower total use of oil 
in the 13 model countries (16 per cent), but also that the 13 model countries have only a small share of 
world consumption, and cross-price elasticities are minimal. On the other hand, the world market price 
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fossil fuel, total use of the fuel in power production in the new equilibrium is equal to 
total use in the original equilibrium. We find that for gas power the quantity effect is 
due to an increase of 23 TWh, whereas 12 TWh is attributed to the allocation effect. 
For coal power and oil power most of the changes are due to the quantity effect. The 
increase in reservoir hydro (5 per cent) is due to more precipitation in equilibrium (a 
hydrological normal year) than in the base year, whereas the decrease for pumped 
storage hydro (76 per cent) reflects a smaller price difference between daytime and 
night in equilibrium than in the base year.7  
 
Figure 1.  Changes in supply of electricity    
 
The discussion above suggests that liberalisation has an impact on the composition of 
electricity supply. After liberalisation, coal power emerges with the largest market 
share (36 per cent versus 29 per cent in 1996), as shown in Table 2. Nuclear, which 
due to technical constraints (cf. Appendix A) can increase production only slightly 
relative to the base year, has the second largest market share (30 per cent). The new 
market shares of gas power (12 per cent) and oil power (7 per cent) are only slightly 
                                                                                                                                                                      
of coal increases by almost 4 per cent, which partly reflects increased use of coal in the model countries 
(45 per cent). 
7  In the base year wholesale prices differed between daytime and night, whereas end-user prices did 
not differ. 
-100
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
Total Coal power Gas power Oil power Nuclear Reservoir Pumped
TWh
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different from the 1996 market shares. The increase in coal power production is the 
main force behind higher total emissions of CO2 – 10 per cent more than in 1996. 
 
Table 2 Market shares and rates of capacity utilisation of supply of electricity 
in a liberalised Western European energy market. Change in 
percentage points relative to 1996 in parenthesis.  
 
Technology Market share Capacity utilisation 
Nuclear 
Coal power 
Gas power 
Oil power 
Reservoir hydro 
Pumped storage hydro 
0.30 (0.35) 
036 (0.29) 
0.12 (0.13) 
0.07 (0.08) 
0.14 (0.13) 
< 0.01 (0.01) 
0.84 (0.80) 
0.88 (0.56) 
0.41 (0.37) 
0.34 (0.30) 
0.42 (0.40) 
0.02 (0.08) 
Also the annual rates of capacity utilisation change after liberalisation. For coal 
power, the rate increases from 56 per cent (base year) to 88 per cent (after 
liberalisation), as shown in Table 2. Nuclear, which had the highest rate of capacity 
utilisation in the base year (80 per cent), has a rate of capacity utilisation of 84 per 
cent in equilibrium. The rates for gas power and oil power increase by around 4 
percentage points (These rates are 41 per cent and 34 per cent, respectively, after the 
liberalisation).  
 
Production of electricity increases in all countries except Austria. Percentage 
increases are highest in the Netherlands (due primarily to more gas power), Great 
Britain (due primarily to more coal power), Denmark (due primarily to more coal 
power and gas power) and Belgium (due primarily to more coal power and gas 
power).  
 
Consumption of electricity increases in all model countries (except Norway), in all 
periods, and for all end-users. Relative to 1996, total consumption at summer night 
has increased by around 30 per cent. For the other periods, the rise is less pronounced 
(13 to 20 per cent). Industry consumption increases by almost 10 per cent, whereas 
household consumption increases by around 25 per cent. We also find a rise in gross 
trade in electricity. In 1996 gross trade amounted to 180 TWh (7.7 per cent of total 
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consumption); after liberalisation, gross trade increases by around 45 per cent. In 
equilibrium, gross trade varies between 58 TWh (summer night) and 71 TWh (winter 
night). 
 
Due to redistribution of natural gas quantities (see discussion above) the composition 
of natural gas consumption changes, albeit only slightly. The share of household 
consumption increases from 48 per cent (base year) to 49 per cent. For industry, the 
share of consumption decreases from 32 per cent (base year) to 31 per cent. 
 
 
 
 
 
5  Concluding remarks 
This study has investigated the short-run effects following from a radical 
liberalisation of the natural gas and electricity markets in Western Europe, using a 
computable equilibrium model of the energy markets. The main features of the model 
are disaggregated demand for four energy goods, with seasonally and time-of-day 
differentiated markets for electricity; supply of electricity based on several 
technologies with differences in efficiency across plants using the same type of 
technology; well-integrated competitive West European markets for natural gas and 
electricity; and competitive world markets for oil and coal.  
 
We find that, relative to 1996, a radical liberalisation leads to a significant reduction 
in end-user prices of natural gas (around 20 per cent) and electricity (around 50 per 
cent). The liberalisation leads to an increase in total welfare in the 13 model countries 
by 15 billion USD, which corresponds to 2 per cent of total energy expenditures for 
the end-users in the model countries. The consumer surplus of the end-users increases 
by 162 billion USD, primarily due to increased surplus for the households. On the 
other hand, operating surplus in electricity production, extraction of natural gas and 
transmission of natural gas decreases by 118, 5 and 6 billion USD, respectively. Also 
tax revenues decrease (-19 billion USD), primarily due to lower VAT income.  
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Because production of electricity increases and a higher share of electricity supply is 
based on fossil fuels (coal), emissions of CO2 increase in Western Europe by around 
10 per cent. In a companion paper we plan to apply the same model to identify the 
level of carbon taxes that would have to be imposed to ensure that CO2 emissions in 
Western Europe are not increased (or to ensure that the Kyoto emission target for 
Western Europe is reached), and examine the impact that such a policy would have on 
the energy markets of Western Europe. 
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Appendix A   Data 
Below we give an overview of our main data sources and explain the main principles 
of the calibration of the model. The base year of the model is 1996. For further 
details, see Aune et al. (2001). 
 
Demand 
In each country, demand is divided into two end-user groups –'household' and 
'industry'. Household covers services and agriculture in addition to households, 
whereas industry covers both the industrial and the transport sectors. 
 
Base-year demand for fossil fuels is taken from Energy Balances of OECD countries, 
1995–1996 (IEA 1998b), whereas base-year demand for electricity is taken from 
Energy Statistics of OECD countries, 1995–1996 (IEA 1998e). In order to calibrate 
period demand for electricity, the annual consumption quantities are split up 
according to the base-year shares of electricity consumption. These are based on 
UCPTE (1998), which gives monthly quantities of electricity consumed and the 
consumption load at 03:00 and 11:00 hours of the third Wednesday of each month. 
For the Nordic countries, equivalent figures are found in NORDEL (1997a; 1997b). 
Base-year prices and taxes are taken mainly from Energy Prices and Taxes, 2nd 
Quarter 1998 (IEA 1998c).  
 
The direct price elasticities for coal, oil, natural gas and electricity build on three 
econometric studies: The SEEM model (Brubakk et al. 1995), the E3ME model 
(Barker 1998) and Franzen and Sterner (1995). In addition, quantities from the IEA 
statistics are used to weigh the original elasticities. Our short-run elasticities lie in the 
interval (–0.05 ; –0.43). Weighed household (industry) short-run elasticities for coal, 
oil, natural gas and electricity are –0.19 (–0.19), –0.21 (–0.20), –0.22 (–0.27) and –
0.32 (–0.20), respectively. Estimates of cross-price elasticities vary significantly in the 
literature. We have chosen equal elasticities across fuels and countries. Because 
substitution possibilities differ across sectors, the cross-price elasticity of the 
household sector (0.025) is lower than for industry (0.05).  
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Supply of fossil fuels 
Base year supply of fossil fuels for the model countries is taken from IEA (1998b); 
for other countries base-year supply (of oil and coal) is taken from Energy Statistics 
and Balances of non-OECD countries, 1995–96 (IEA 1998d). Short-run supply 
elasticities for oil and coal are set to 1; see Golombek and Bråten (1994).  
 
Electricity supply 
Because efficiency differs across plants with the same type of technology, we assume 
that thermal efficiency is a linear function of capacity utilisation.8 In order to 
determine a linear function, one needs two exogenous values. We let one point be the 
thermal efficiency of the most efficient plant, which in general is assumed equal to the 
efficiencies reported for new plants in Projected Costs of Generating Electricity, 
Update 1992 (IEA, 1992).  
 
A candidate for the second point of the linear function could be observed efficiency, 
calculated as net electricity production to fuel use.9 However, there are problems 
involved in using the observed average efficiencies. Firstly, the unused parts of all 
electricity capacities have unobserved efficiency. Assuming these are mainly vintage 
plants with lower efficiency, the ('true') average efficiency of total capacity will be 
lower than the observed average efficiency. Secondly, the different electricity-
producing technologies do not have a constant rate of capacity utilisation throughout 
the year. Capacity utilisation rates are not known from primary data. Instead of using 
observed average efficiency directly to determine the second point, we have calibrated 
the rate of capacity utilisation for each technology and period by imposing the 
following condition: for each country, the outcome should be consistent with cost 
minimisation in electricity production given our data (annual production from 
different technologies, period consumption, etc.). The problem is solved by running 
the electricity production block of the model. This solution provides the efficiency of 
                                                          
8 For pumped storage we assume a fixed efficiency, calculated as the ratio of electricity produced to 
electricity consumed, with data from IEA (1998a). 
9 In some countries a substantial share of power plants produce both heat and electricity. The mix of 
heat and electricity production shows a wide dispersion between countries and fuels, and the data did 
not lend support to a common trade-off between heat and electricity across fuels. We therefore estimate 
trade-offs separately for each fuel on 1996 data from the cross-section of the model countries. The 
trade-offs were used to transform produced (and consumed) heat to produced (and consumed) 
electricity.  
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the least efficient plant (for each technology and country), which we have used as the 
second point in the linear efficiency function.  
 
All electricity plants require some down-time for maintenance and upgrading. Our 
model reflects this by restricting total annual production to a fraction of installed 
capacity. For most technologies the fraction is set to 0.90 (conversation with industry 
experts). However, because nuclear is typically run as base-load in most countries, we 
have assumed that actual usage in 1996 reflects maintenance and upgrading only. The 
exception is France, which had a capacity utilisation in 1996 of 0.76: that is, 
production was probably restricted also due to low base-load demand relative to 
nuclear capacity. For France we have used the average rate of capacity utilisation for 
all other  countries as an estimate (0.84).  
 
Supply of reservoir hydro 
For Norway, Sweden and Finland, inflow capacity –the amount of precipitation in the 
catchment area in a hydrological normal year – is documented in NORDEL (1997a). 
For the other model countries, our estimates are based on data from IEA (1998a). 
 
Reservoir capacity measures how much water (in GWh) can be stored in the reservoir: 
that is, the maximum amount of water that can be transferred from end of the summer 
season to beginning of the winter season, and vice versa. NORDEL (1997a) provides 
data on nominal reservoir capacities, whereas from Nordpool (1999) we obtain the 
maximum, minimum and median filling share for Norway, Sweden and Finland for 1 
April and 1 October. These two sources are used to estimate feasible reservoir 
capacity for the Nordic countries. The estimates, in combination with information 
from UNIPEDE (1997), are used to estimate feasible reservoir capacity for the 
remaining countries in our model.  
 
Transport of electricity and natural gas  
We have used UCPTE (1998) and NORDEL (1998) as sources for international 
transmission capacities for electricity. The cost estimates of international 
transmission, national transport and distribution of electricity are based on Amundsen 
et al. (1997), but inflated to 1996 prices. The resulting 3.2 USD/MWh for industry 
domestic transport costs is used in all countries, but the household distribution costs 
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of 11.8 USD/MWh are varied across countries, in proportion to estimated distribution 
losses. 
 
The starting point for capacity figures for transport of natural gas is Grabarczyk, 
McCallum and Wergeland (1993), but these estimates have been revised by industry 
experts. The main source for costs of natural gas transport is Golombek, Gjelsvik and 
Rosendahl (1995). However, due to substantial cost reductions in construction of new 
transmission lines over the last decade, our cost figures are lower than those in 
Golombek et al. (1995). For costs of domestic transport and distribution of natural 
gas, we take our starting point in official cost estimates for Germany. According to 
Natural Gas Distribution (IEA, 1998f), costs of national transport in Germany is 55 
USD per toe, whereas costs of distribution is 105 USD per toe. These figures are used 
to estimate the costs of the other model countries, under the assumption that for each 
type of cost, the difference between two countries is due to amount of natural gas 
transported/distributed (data from IEA, 1998b) and length of the domestic 
transport/distribution network (data from Figas, 1997).  
 
 
 
 
